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Abstract
In a local economy, the citizens can react on local policy by exit.
Exit induces a shift in the housing demand. The local policy may thus
capitalize into the housing prices. However, the citizens encounter spe-
cific coordination problems on the housing market. Therefore, it may
be asked how effective their exit option is. To answer this question,
we work with a sample of 234 U.S. counties, from 2002 and 2003. Our
empirical analysis shows that the property tax revenue is the local
fiscal variable which has the strongest connection with the housing
prices. In contradiction to the general theory, this connection is posi-
tive and indirect. The essential element within this connection is the
personal income.
Keywords: local policy, exit, housing price, capitalization
JEL Classification: H30, H72, R21
1 Local Policy and Modes of Reaction
There are two basic modes in which a citizen can react on local policy:
’voice’ and ’exit’. We may find various reasons why the voice mode would
lead to inefficient outcomes. One major reason is that it pays off to vote
strategically. Thus, a citizen does not reveal her true preferences. Another
major reason is that the aggregation of individual votes induces deficiencies.
As Arrow (1951) showed, no aggregation can altogether satisfy the following
five axioms: unanimity, nondictatorship, transitivity, unrestricted domain,
independence of irrelevant alternatives.1 Hence, we will ask under which
conditions the exit mode leads to superior outcomes.
1For a further discussion, see Mueller (2003), chapter 24.
Tiebout (1956) outlined a model in which a citizen can choose her pre-
ferred package of local policy, by exit. In this model, each local government
offers a special, fixed package of public goods. It charges its local residents
with a head tax. Each government seeks to maximize its own profit. This
means that it minimizes its costs for local public goods per resident. Depend-
ing on the current number of residents, it will promote entry or exit. Thus,
the competition between local governments takes up two functions: First,
it makes the citizens reveal their true preferences. Second, it constrains the
local governments in their profits. Nevertheless, there exist six conditions to
reach an efficient total outcome:
1. the range of policy offerings spans the full range of the citizens’ respec-
tive preferences;
2. there are no economies of scale or minimum lots in the production of
public goods;
3. the citizens have perfect information about the local policies;
4. the citizens are perfectly mobilie;
5. there are no spillovers;
6. a citizen’s income does not depend on where she resides.
In this equilibrium, the citizens are thus sorted into local groups of equal
preferences and equal incomes. However, we may state that the conditions
are extremely rigorous. Basically, they describe a nonspatial world.2 A
spatial world, by contrast, tends to deviate from these conditions (especially
from 4 to 6). Here, the housing market plays a key role in the supply of and
demand for local policy. As we are going to see, housing has some special
characteristics. Due to these characteristics, a housing market tends to incur
inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies may transmit to the market for local policy.
2 Special Characteristics of Housing
Housing has five characteristics which make it play a special role in a local
economy. First, housing is immobile. It is fixed to a special site. The site
makes it unique. Second, housing is durable. It may offer utility for a longer
period. The period can be extended by maintenance work. Third, housing
is heterogeneous. It has particularly many features. Some of them cannot
2For an introductory discussion, see Mueller (2003), chapter 9.
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be replicated. The number of possible combinations goes beyond an agent’s
power of imagination. Fourth, housing is prone to externalities. It is a
rather inflexible element of a greater system. Externalities can arise in the
form of: pollution, noise, disease infection, visual aspects, and so on. And
fifth, housing is very costly. It normally claims a major share of a user’s life-
time income. Moreover, a user may develop various forms of housing specific
capital which gets lost if she leaves.3
These special characteristics induce various coordination problems. The
key problem is that the ’fair’ value of a housing can only be appraised.
There are three different appraisal approaches: First, the sales comparison
approach. The value of a housing is appraised in comparison to the sales
price of similar objects. Additions and deductions are made with respect
to the differences. Second, the cost approach. The value is appraised by
the costs it would take to reproduce or to replace the housing. Reproduc-
tion refers to a housing with the same material characteristics. Replacement
refers to a housing which offers the same utility. Third, the income capital-
ization approach. The value is appraised by the capital inflows and outflows
that a housing generates as an investment object. For an owner-occupied
object, a potential rent has to be included. - Each of these appraisal ap-
proaches has its specific limits and drawbacks.4 They may lead to significant
deviations in their results for one and the same object. The fair value thus
remains quite uncertain. Moreover, the relevant data may change intensively.
The fair value thus tends to fluctuate a lot. But, the market participants
can hardly perceive and hardly adapt to the fluctuations. As a result, in-
efficiencies may arise in form of: insolvency, abandonment, homelessness,
discrimination, congestion, and so on.
3 Housing Policy and Capitalization
Due to the (inherent) coordination problems on the housing market, it can
be expedient that the government intervenes. An intervention may be fo-
cused on the supply side, the demand side, or the price. In many cases,
a government needs some specific information to contrive the right form of
intervention. It therefore seems expedient to assign the respective respons-
abilities to a lower level within the public sector. Overall, we can distinguish
five types of housing market interventions: First, zoning: The government
stipulates rules on the site, the structure, and the housing activities. Such
policy intents to internalize externalities. Second, housing development: The
3For a further discussion, see O’Sullivan (2003), chapter 13.
4For a further discussion, see Lusht (1997).
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government subsidizes housing construction, on certain conditions. The con-
ditions can be put on the site or the structure. The intention is to increase or
upgrade the supply of housing. Third, housing assistance: The government
offers financial aid to specific groups of housing demanders. This aid can be
in the form of: rent grants, ownership grants, mortgage programs, and so
on. Each form intents to strengthen specific groups on the demand side of
the market. Fourth, public housing: The government itself enters the market
with some special supply. This may follow the intention to put downward
pressure on the prices, or to guarantee some affordable housing to a specific
group of demanders. And fifth, rent control: The government stipulates a
certain rent level or rent growth. It thus may intent to push the whole market
into a specific direction.5
Good housing policy thus improves the coordination on the housing mar-
ket. However, any local policy may affect the local housing price. Citizens
may react on it by entry or exit. Such a reaction increases the housing de-
mand in the region of entry and the housing supply in the region of exit.
Normally, citizens are ’pulled’ by local services and ’pushed’ by local contri-
butions. Hence, local public expenditure capitalizes positively into the local
housing values and local public revenue negatively. The degree of capitaliza-
tion depends on the efficiency of the corresponding local policy. The housing
price may thus not only serve as an indicator for scarcities on the housing
market but also for inefficiencies on the market for local public goods.
4 How to Measure Capitalization
A standard method to meausre capitalization follows the hedonic approach.
This approach considers housing as a bundle of utility generating character-
istics. Each of these characteristics has an implicit price. The market price
of housing is the sum of all its implicit prices. The implicit prices determine
the market price; not the other way round.
A salient study on the capitalization of local fiscal policy was made by
Oates (1969). He set up an estimation equation in which the median housing
value depends on the effective property tax rate and the annual expenditures
on education per pupil. The control variables referred to the number of
rooms, the age of the houses, the family income, and the poverty line. To
run the estimation, Oates took a sample of 53 municipalities in New Jersey
(U.S.A.), 1959-61. To avoid any possible bias from simultaneity, he used
the 2SLS method. He thus got the following results: The property taxes
5For a general discussion of housing policy, see O’Sullivan (2003), chapters 14-16; for
the role of property taxation, see Netzer (1966), Hamilton (1975).
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capitalize negatively into the housing value, the expenditures on education
positively. In a direct comparison of the coefficent values, it could be said
that the expenditures on education nearly compensate for the property taxes.
Oates regarded all his results as quite robust.
Oates’ study launched an extensive discussion on the right estimation
model. In particular, the discussion dealt with the following possible aspects
of capitalization:
• Pollakowski (1973): Some other local fiscal variables are highly corre-
lated with the property taxes, the expenditures on education, and the
housing value.
• Pollakowski (1973): The average family or household income is highly
correlated with the fiscal variables and the housing value.
• Edel and Sclar (1974): At least in the long run, the local policy adapts
to the total demand. Such adaptation reduces capitalization effects.
• Church (1974): Administrative procedures have an important impact
on the capitalization effects.
• Wales and Wiens (1974): The effective property tax rate contains the
housing value in its denominator. As an explanatory variable, it induces
spurious correlation.
• King (1977): Capitalization effects rather depend on what the potential
housing demander perceive than on how the local policy really is.
• Rosen and Fullerton (1977): Public expenditure variables describe the
input for public goods; but the demanders are more interested in the
output.
• Goodman (1983): Capitalization effects stem from inside and from
outside of the region.
The discussion has shown that a measurement of capitalization encounters
problems which may restrict the explanatory power of the results, consider-
ably. Let us recapitulate some of these inherent problems.6
A first group deals with the choice of the explained variable. In a gov-
ernmental region, there may exist various housing prices. Each housing price
6See also Oates (1973), Bloom/ Ladd/ Yinger (1983), Quigley (1985), Hoyt/ Rosenthal
(1997), Hoxby (1999), Guilfoyle (2000), Hwang/ Quigley (2006).
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reflects a certain segment of the housing market. The segments may be af-
fected by the local policy in different ways. Thus: Which housing price is
the most representative for the local policy?
A second group of inherent problems deals with the choice of the explain-
ing variables. Various aspects of local policy may affect the housing prices.
Some of these aspects can be measured in monetary units. Still, two question
arise: How do the citizens perceive these values? What do the citizens relate
these values to in their judgements? Other aspects of local policy cannot
be measured in monetary units: Here, the question arises: How can these
aspects be integrated into the estimation of the housing price? Dummy vari-
ables may appear as very restrictive solutions. Anyway, each aspect of local
policy may have a specific time perspective. Thus: How long does it take
until a certain policy measure capitalizes into the housing price? Moreover,
the causal relationship needs not necessarily be uni-directional.
A third group of inerent problems relates to the control variables. There
may exist many other determinants of housing prices than local policy. But,
these other determinant may still be related to the local policy. Moreover,
they may be interrelated. Thus: How can all these relationships be reconciled
with the estimation model? An estimation model follows the task to explain
as much of the variation in the housing price as possible. The regression
coefficient of a local policy variable depends on the total explanatory power
of the regression. Thus: How can a regression coefficient be interpreted as
an indicator for the degree of capitalization?
A fourth and final group of inherent problems refers to the choice of the
sample. Each sample bases on a specific market concept. The key question
is: Does this concept conform to the theoretical and practical requirements
implied by the issue? One requirement is that the sample delimit the relevant
housing market. Due to the heterogeneity of housing markets, this may
appear as particularly difficult. Another requirement is that the environment
of the sample objects do not contain disturbances. Such disturbances could
exist in any form of hidden market imperfections. And finally, the sample
should cover the whole range of determinants. The determinants of housing
prices tend to form an interdependent system.
5 The Data
Data which nicely conform to our requirements have been produced by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census. The Bureau has generated these data within two
distinctive survey programs: the ’American Community Survey (ACS)’ and
the ’Census of Governments (CoG)’.
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Above all, the ACS includes a broad range of variables on demography,
income, and housing in U.S. counties. A survey has been made each year since
1999. Starting with 2006, each survey is supposed to cover every U.S. county
with a population of 65,000 or more. For 1999 to 2005, the survey covers
most counties with a population of 250,000 or more, plus several selected
smaller ones. The results from these years are extended by extrapolations.
Nonetheless, the data can be regarded as highly reliable.
The CoG seeks to include all local government financial activities in the
U.S.A. A survey has been made in five-years intervals since 1957. The sur-
vey for the fiscal year 2001-02 covers a total of 87,525 local governments.
The governments are of five distinctive types: county (3,043), municipal-
ity (19,429), township (16,504), school district (13,506), and special district
(35,052). The Bureau aggregates the results for each government according
to its county region. County regions are the main local geographical units
in the U.S.A. The aggregation thus allows to compare and combine various
local variables.
6 Descriptive Statistics
A housing price is the price which an agent pays for the right to consume
services from a respective housing object. Since housing offers heterogeneous
services, housing prices may vary a lot. Nevertheless, housing prices may
also have common determinants. Some of these determinants can be defined
by a governmental region. In one such region, each housing is subject to
common rules or political interventions, for instance. It thus can make sense
to describe the housing prices by statistical measures which refer to specific
regions.
There are two basic modes in which an agent can get the right to con-
sume services form a given housing object: purchase and rent. Under very
restrictive conditions, the purchasing price is the net present value of all rent
payments. However, many violations of these conditions may appear on a
housing market, such as: information asymmetry, risk inclination, or dis-
crimination in regulation. Then, the purchasing price and the rent diverge.
Hence, a housing market may split into two submarkets: one for purchase,
the other for rent.
Table 1 presents some statistical measures of the housing prices in U.S.
counties, in 2002 and 2003. As we can see, the housing value variables
(HSVALL, HSVALM, HSVALU) highly differ from the housing rent variables
(RENTCM, RENTGM). The housing values are more dispersed and less
symmetric. They increased more from 2002 to 2003. Moreover, HSVALL is
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less symmetric than HSVALU. RENTCM and RENTGM show very similar
distributions.
variable mean std. dev. skewn. J.-Bera
HSVALL02 126767 66591 1.878 370
HSVALM02 172595 91255 1.913 343
HSVALU02 244671 130008 1.813 249
RENTCM02 623.85 173.44 0.943 51.0
RENTGM02 711.85 163.36 0.976 56.2
HSVALL03 140797 79273 1.705 235
HSVALM03 191668 106134 1.707 213
HSVALU03 270519 146860 1.643 177
RENTCM03 642.98 174.70 0.721 21.0
RENTGM03 737.25 169.12 0.714 20.4
Table 1: Housing prices: 2002 and 2003
Housing is especially characterized by its costs. The costs are higher and
more diverse than those of other goods. Since housing may include a quasi
infinite amount of services, we consider it as a superior good. Thus, the
demand for housing must positively depend on the income over the whole
domain. Next, the question arises: Which is the relevant single unit of hous-
ing demand? Individuals may want to share their housing consumption with
others. Therefore, the relevant income may be found between the individual
and its household. Table 2 presents some statistical measures on the incomes
on our field of examination. We can see that the household median income
(HHMINC) has nearly double the size of the per capita income (PCINC).
Moreover, HHMINC is somewhat more dispersed and less symmetric. It in-
creased less from 2002 to 2003. Thus, it seems that the average household
size decreased.
variable mean std. dev. skewn. J.-Bera
PCINC02 24673 5228 0.507 12.8
HHMINC02 48821 11984 0.798 25.6
PCINC03 25045 5196 0.603 19.1
HHMINC03 49208 12135 0.821 27.7
Table 2: Average Income: 2002 and 2003
Potentially, any aspect of local policy may capitalize into the housing
prices. Our central question is: To what degree does local policy affect the
housing supply and demand. The monetary positions of a government are
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recorded in its budget. The fiscal budget is supposed to reflect the essence
of its policy. Table 3 presents some selected statistical information about
local fiscal budgets in the U.S.A. in the fiscal year 2001/02. The fiscal values
refer to the total budget size (b) or to the county’s population size (p). In
particular, we can see the following: The two major sources of local public
revenue are intergovernmental transfers (IGMREV) and property taxation
(PPTAX). Together, they amount to nearly two thirds of the total budget
size. In relation to the total budget size, the revenue from both sources is
very equally and symmetrically distributed. By contrast, IGMREV02c is
particularly dispersed and nonsymmetric. The highest share of the total rev-
enue is spent on education. On average, EDUCAT02b amounts to more than
40%. As a special feature, this variable is skewed to the left. EDUCAT02p
is, however, skewed to the right and somewhat less symmetric. Relatively
little money is spent on housing development (HSDEV). There seem to be
some few counties which spend clearly more, at least in per capita terms.
variable mean std. dev. skewn. J.-Bera
IGMREV02p 1.294 0.5923 1.96 649
IGMREV02b 0.345 0.1033 0.24 2.33
PPTAX02p 1.044 0.4434 1.07 64.7
PPTAX02b 0.291 0.1207 0.64 15.7
EDUCAT02p 1.533 0.358 0.23 21.7
EDUCAT02b 0.412 0.108 -0.48 9.04
HSDEV02p 0.099 0.081 2.12 550
HSDEV02b 0.025 0.016 1.03 68.2
Table 3: Local fiscal variables: 2002
7 Regressions
We can check to what degree a fiscal variable may capitalize into the housing
prices by simple regression. Based on our sample, we regress each housing
price variable on each fiscal variable. It turns out that the strongest connec-
tions are those between the property tax revenue per capita (PPTAX02p) and
the housing prices in 2003. The major results of the respective regressions
are shown by table 4.
It turns out that PPTAX02p is positively related to the housing prices;
which contradicts the general theoretical expectations. This fiscal variable
can explain between 17% and 29% of the variations in the housing prices. The
R-squared value for the upper quartile housing values (HSVALU03) is clearly
higher than the one for the lower quartile (HSVALL03). The Jarque-Bera
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values describe the distributions of the residuals. We can state that those of
the housing values are even less symmetric than those of the housing rents.
Actually, a scatter diagram shows that there exist some outliers on both sides
of the regression line. The RESET values do not indicate misspecification
for any of these regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c 62676 79735 110775 424.12 523.34
(5.18) (5.0) (5.06) (17.1) (21.8)
PPTAX02p 74797 107169 152946 209.55 204.81
(7.02) (7.63) (7.93) (9.57) (9.70)
R-squ. 0.175 0.20 0.213 0.283 0.288
J.-Bera 346 344 289 47.6 41.7
RESET 0.09 0.28 0.27 0.68 0.44
Table 4: Simple regressions: housing prices in 2003 on property tax
Only based on these simple regressions, we cannot say much about which
role property taxes actually play in the determination of housing prices. The
housing prices may be connected with many other factors. The factors may
be connected with each other. Connection does not necessarily imply deter-
mination. Hence, to learn more about the actual role of property taxes, we
use some specific strategy to construct multiple regressions. First, we regress
each housing price on the whole available set of potential determinants. Then,
we eliminate each regressor that appears as unstable or redundant. We repeat
the two steps until we get estimating equations which contain only stable and
non-redundant regressors. Table 5 shows such equations.
There remain three regressors in each equation. Each includes the share
of foreign born in the population (FGBORN02) and the share of households
with a income from self-employment (SFEMPL03). The first variable reaches
higher t-values than the second. The highest t-values, however, are reached
by the third regressor. In the equations (1) to (4), it is the per capita
income (PCINC03). In the equation (5), it is the median household income
(HHMINC03). Each coefficient has a positive sign. Together, the regressors
can explain between 70% and 81% of the variation of each housing price.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c -177802 -236646 -328746 -99.007 -93.655
(-11.3) (-11.5) (-11.8) (-3.27) (-3.81)
FGBORN03 376598 518239 705286 785.77 636.63
(10.6) (11.2) (11.2) (11.5) (10.3)
SFEMPL03 849936 1016567 1307460 1193.4 830.44
(8.29) (7.60) (7.18) (6.05) (4.69)
PCINC03 7.1306 10.101 14.743 0.0206
(12.3) (13.4) (14.4) (18.5)
HHMINC03 0.0097
(22.3)
adj. R-squ. 0.706 0.720 0.730 0.775 0.807
Table 5: Multiple regressions: housing prices on stable and non-redundant
variables: OLS
PPTAX02p appears as an unstable or redundant regressor for the hous-
ing prices. To understand why, we seek to explain the determination of
PPTAX02p, itself. For this, we construct a multiple regression of this vari-
able in the same way as of the housing prices. The respective results are
shown by table 6.
Out of our whole set of regressors, two appear as stable and non-redundant:
the local public expenditure on education per capita (EDUCAT02p) and the
per capita income (PCINC02). The latter regressor is even somewhat more
significant than the first. Both have positive signs. Together, they can ex-
plain 62% of the variation of PPTAX02p.
(6)
c -0.93288
(-9.06)
EDUCAT02p 0.49719
(9.58)
PCINC02 0.00005
(13.9)
adj. R-squ. 0.620
Table 6: Multiple regression: PPTAX02p on stable and non-redundant vari-
ables: OLS
Next, we seek to assess the power of this estimation with respect to the
housing prices. For this, we regress each housing price on the respective
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fitted values (f). The results are shown by table 7. In each estimating equa-
tion, the coefficient of PPTAX02pf is positive and highly significant. The
regressor can explain between 36% and 51% of the housing price’s varia-
tion. The regressions of the housing values perform worse in the Jarque-Bera
test and in the RESET than those of the housing rents. One reason is that
they have insignificant constants (c). Nevertheless, all five simple regres-
sions reveal strong connections between the per capita income (PCINC02),
the local public expenditure for education (EDUCAT02p), the property tax
(PPTAX02p), and the housing prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c -2600.3 -7527.5 -13795 270.59 377.85
(0.84) (-0.44) (0.55) (10.7) (15.4)
PPTAX02pf 137295 190717 272214 356.54 344.11
(11.6) (12.3) (13.0) (15.6) (15.5)
R-squ. 0.368 0.396 0.421 0.510 0.507
J.-Bera 361 367 309 30.0 19.7
RESET 1.14 3.39 4.82 0.01 0.08
Table 7: Simple regressions: housing prices in 2003 on fitted property tax
We finally seek to assess how PCINC02 and PPTAX02p jointly affect the
housing prices. Our previous analysis confirms the suspicion that the two
variables may induce simultaneous equation bias. Therefore, we need to use
an estimation technique which allows to circumvent such bias. The 2SLS is
one technique with this property; it has become a standard.7 We follow this
standard. As a special instrument, we take EDUCAT02p. The results of the
2SLS regressions are shown by table 8.
In the regressions of the housing values, the coefficients of PPTAX02p
are only significant on a 10%-level. In the regressions of the housing rents,
they are insignificant. In comparison to our OLS results from table 5, the t-
values of all the other regressors become lower, especially those of PCINC03
and HHMINC03. Except for the constant terms, each significant coefficient
is positive. Thus, there is no change of sign. The results are quite stable.
However, the 2SLS estimating equations explain less of the variation in the
housing prices than the respective OLS equations.
7For an explanation of the 2SLS estimation technique, see Greene (2000), chapter 16.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c -172796 -229492 -317989 -93.788 103.20
(-10.4) (-10.6) (-10.7) (-3.03) (3.86)
PPTAX02p 31491.9 44996.0 67668.6 32.827 -48.347
(1.66) (1.82) (1.99) (0.93) (-1.37)
FGBORN03 350625 481128 649476 758.69 688.35
(8.79) (9.24) (9.10) (10.2) (9.58)
SFEMPL03 954613 1166132 1532388 1302.5 688.35
(7.73) (7.23) (6.93) (5.64) (3.24)
PCINC03 5.2645 7.4344 10.7335 0.0186
(4.13) (4.47) (4.70) (7.83)
HHMINC03 0.0107
(11.9)
adj. R-squ. 0.684 0.699 0.705 0.773 0.788
Table 8: Multiple regressions: housing prices in 2003 on PPTAX02p,
PCINC03, and others: 2SLS
8 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In the real world, citizens may encounter severe problems, if they seek to
react on local policy by exit. Many of these problems may arise due to
the housing market. Housing has five special characteristics which make the
coordination of supply and demand more difficult. A local government could
help to lower the difficulties. However, it may have some special interest in
the housing market outcomes.
If citizens react on local policy by exit, the housing demand shifts. In
theory, an increase in local public expenditures increases the local housing
demand; and an increase in local public revenues decreases it. Local fiscal
policy thus capitalizes into the housing prices. However, real capitalization
effects are difficult to measure. Difficulties arise with respect to each basic
component of an estimation: the housing price as explained variable, the
fiscal policy as explaining variable, the control variables, and the sample.
In this study, we develop a new approach to estimate real capitalization
effects. We take particular care of interdependency, redundancy, and sta-
bility. We work with a sample of 234 larger U.S. counties, from 2002 and
2003. Five distinctive housing prices are considered. The fiscal variables are
expressed in relation to the total size of the local population and to the total
size of the local fiscal budget. Special attention is paid to the local average
income. Our major results are as follows:
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Out of all available fiscal variables, the property tax revenue per capita
has the strongest connection with the housing prices. In contradiction to
what the theory predicts, this connection is positive. Moreover, it seems to
be rather indirect. Based on the OLS method, the property tax revenue per
capita appears as a redundant regressor. Three other variables turn out to
be dominant: the share of foreign born in the population, the share of house-
holds with a income from self-employment, and the local average income. In
a next step, the local average income and the local public expenditure on
education per capita turn out to be the dominant regressors of the property
tax revenue per capita. Thus, the local average income seems to be the key
factor in the connection between the property tax revenue and the housing
prices. To estimate the joint effects of property taxes and income on housing
prices, we use the 2SLS method. This method allows us to account for the
interdependencies. As a result, the property taxes get only slightly signifi-
cant in three out of five cases. The income gets significant in each case; but
the level is lower than in the OLS regressions, without the property taxes.
Overall, it can be concluded that exit was a rather uneffective mode to
react on local policy in the U.S.A., in 2002 and 2003. The local fiscal variable
which had the strongest connection with the housing prices was the property
tax revenue per capita. However, the sign of this connection was opposite to
the general theoretical prediction. Other reasons to exit were much stronger
than fiscal policy, especially: the form of employment, the citizenship, and
the personal income. There were two dominant factors which related to the
property tax revenue per capita: the local public expenditure on education
per capita and the average personal income. These two positive relationships
may justify the imposition of property taxes. However, these are only rough
guidelines for the choice of a local policy instrument. Two central issues still
remain rather unclear: How does the property tax affect the coordination
problems on the housing market? To what degree do citizens accept the
property tax? Further research is needed, especially with respect to the
voice mode of reaction.
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appendix
List of Empirical Variables
AVTRT workers 16 years and over who did not work at
home: average travel time to work
BACHPL population 25 and over: percent bachelors degree
or higher
BELPOV population for whom poverty status is determined:
percent income in the past 12 months below
poverty level
CUCHAR current charges
DEBTSV total government debt services
DETDHS housing units: percent detached
DSHS housing units: density per acre of land
DSPOP population: density per acre of land
EDUCAT expenditure: educational sevices: education
FGBORN population: percent foreign born
FINADM expenditure: government administration: finan-
cial administration
HEALTH expenditure: social sevice and income mainte-
nance: health
HHMINC household median income
HHWMIN total households: percent with one or more people
under 18 years
HHWSEN total households: percent with one or more people
65 years and over
HIEMPL population 16 years and over: usually worked 35
or more hours per week, 50 to 52 weeks per year
HIGHW expenditure: transportation: highways
HSAGE median age of housing structure
HSDEBT specified owner-occupied housing units: percent
with a mortgage contract to purchase, or simlar
debt
HSDEVM expenditure: housing and community development
HSVALL specified owner-occupied housing units: lower
value quartile (1)
HSVALM specified owner-occupied housing units: median
value (2)
HSVALU specified owner-occupied housing units: upper
value quartile (3)
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IGMREV total intergovernmental revenue
INTRST total households: percent with interest, dividends,
or net rental income
LABFC total population: percent in labor force
MDNRR median number of rooms
MINOR total population: percent of people under 18
MVSMCT population 5 years plus: percent moved within
same county within last 5 years
MV1DCT population 1 year and over: different house 1 year
ago in the same county
NUSCIT population: percent not a U.S. citizen
OCC1PS occupied housing units: percent 1-person house-
hold
OCCDUR owner occupied housing: median duration of occu-
pancy
ONEPHH total households: percent of one-person house-
holds
OSCREV total general revenue from own sources
OTHADM expenditure: other government administration
OTHTAX revenue from other taxes
OWNOCC occupied housing units: percent owner occupied
PCINC total population: per capita income
POLICE expenditure: public safety: police protection
PPTAX total property tax revenue (6)
PUBASS total households: percent with public assistance
income
RECRTN expenditure: environment and housing: parks and
recreation
REINC specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median gross rent as a percentage of
household income
RENTCM specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median contract rent (4)
RENTGM specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median gross rent (5)
RETIRE total households: percent with retirement income
RM3OL housing units: percent 3 rooms or less
SFEMPL total households: percent with self-employment in-
come
SMHS5Y population 5 years plus: percent have lived in the
same house for 5 years
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TLDEBT total government indebtness
TLEXPD total expenditure
TLREV total revenue
TLTAX total tax revenue
UNEMPL population in labor force: percent unemployed
UTREV utility revenue
VACHS housing units: percent vacant
WGSAL total households: percent with wage or salary in-
come
WHITE total population: percent of white population
WKCTRSD workers 16 years and over: worked in the county
of residence
WKPBTRP workers 16 years and over: percent used public
transportation
WKWALK workers 16 years and over: percent walked
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